时间：2022年5月18日（星期三）15:30-16:30
地点：腾讯会议：878-425-388
主题：难得糊涂:信息共享与交换下零售商的智力危害（When Ignorance is Bliss: the Retailer’s Intelligence Hazard under Information Sharing and Exchanging）
主讲人：刘斌（上海理工大学管理学院）
简介：刘斌，教授、博士生导师、沪江领军人才特聘教授，教育部高等学校管理科学与工程类专业教指委委员（2018-2022）。目前兼任管理科学与工程学会常务理事、中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会常务理事、FMS-A类期刊《中国管理科学》、SCI期刊《GSTA》等6家期刊编委。多年来从事供应链管理、灰色系统理论及其应用等领域研究，第一作者或通讯作者在Production and Operations Management（UTD24）、IEEE Transaction on SMC A等期刊共发表论文143篇，其中SCI/SSCI期刊50余篇。主持承担或完成的项目有：国家自然科学基金面上项目4项（后评估均为优或特优）。
摘要：需求信息在企业的订购和生产计划中起着至关重要的作用。因此，供应链企业投资于行业需求信息推理能力的情况并不少见；然而，尚未有研究探讨此类信息对供应链企业和整个供应链效率的影响。本文研究了在一个由两个相互竞争的制造商和一个共同零售商组成的供应链中，零售商的智力对企业在信息共享和信息交换方面的激励的影响。一般来说，零售商推断制造商需求信息的能力各不相同。如果零售商能够根据批发价格推断出制造商的需求信息，那么他就被认为是聪明的；否则，他被称为近视的。我们的分析首先表明，无论零售商是短视的还是聪明的，零售商都不想单方面向上与制造商分享他的信息。虽然制造商可以有条件地从零售商的智力（推断力）中受益，但当产品可替代性较低且信息信号准确度较高时，零售商在智力（推断力）方面面临劣势（即零售商的智力风险）。我们进一步发现，短视零售商愿意与制造商进行双边信息交换，且信息不会完全伤害零售商交换信息的动机；然而，在信息交换的情况下，零售商的智力危害仍然存在。我们最后观察到，在双边信息交换下，双边支付转移可能有助于消除智力危害，但不能解决单边信息共享下的智力危害。
Demand information has ubiquitously played a critical role in firms’ ordering and production planning. It is thus not uncommon for a supply chain firm to invest in demand information inference capability in industries; however, no study has explored the impact of such intelligence on supply chain firms and the entire supply chain’s efficiency. This paper investigates the impact of a retailer’s intelligence regarding the firms’ incentives in both information sharing and information exchanging in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers and a common retailer. In general, the capability of the retailer to infer the manufacturers’ demand information varies. A retailer is considered intelligent if he can infer the manufacturers’ demand information based on the wholesale prices; otherwise, he is referred to as myopic. Our analysis first reveals that, regardless of whether the retailer is myopic or intelligent, the retailer does not want to unilaterally share his information upward with the manufacturers. Although the manufacturers can conditionally benefit from the retailer’s intelligence, the retailer faces a disadvantage for being intelligent (i.e., the retailer’s intelligence hazard) when product substitutability is low and information signal accuracy is high. We further find that a myopic retailer is willing to bilaterally exchange information with the manufacturers and the intelligence does not fully undermine the retailer’s incentives to exchange information; however, the retailer’s intelligence hazard still persists under information exchanging. We finally observe that side payment transfer may help eliminate the intelligence hazard under bilateral information exchanging, but it cannot resolve the intelligence hazard under unilateral information sharing.
